An interesting argument, like a musical composition, should generate several interpretations of the same idea. We have offered one perspective on the dilemma facing social epidemiology (1), and in his commentary (2) Dr. Muntaner extends our argument in a new direction. While we share many points of agreement with Dr. Muntaner, we will concentrate here on the source of greatest contention in order to push the exchange one step further. Aside from objecting that social epidemiology was unfairly singled out for criticism, Muntaner's main disagreement with us lies in our emphasis on methodology rather than social theory. He opens by asserting that "the main reason why social epidemiology has not provided better explanations is lack of social theory" (2, p. 121), and, in relation to the principal example of race, concludes that "(suggestions of innate racial predispositions... are the consequence not of an inappropriate use of counterfactual arguments but of the lack of attention to social theory" (2, p. 123).
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We agree that much of epidemiology suffers from theoretical confusion, and nowhere is this more pervasive than in studies of race and ethnicity, where any observed difference is hailed as a minor discovery. To avoid the charge that we are bullying a vulnerable discipline, we concede that the bulk of energy in all branches of science is dissipated in the documentation of trivial observations. In the epidemiologic literature on social factors, however, we are overwhelmed with observations masquerading as discoveries ("poor people and Blacks have higher rates of X, Y, and Z...") (e.g., see Dries et al. (3) ). For the synthesis of these observations into valid etiologic inferences, investigators are poorly served by routine adjustment tech-niques. Were there a general lack of theory, inferences would be haphazard and incoherent. Rather, it appears that social epidemiology does have a theoretical consensus: a reductionist approach to science which views the individual as a self-creating agent of his/her health status. Inevitably this theory is a corollary of the larger social outlook, and when applied to race and class, it begins with the assumption that the working class is stupid and people of color are genetically inferior. The excess disease burden among these groups is therefore what one would expect among the victims of unhappy situations and bad health habits. While many in the field may blanch at this characterization, the frequency with which social variables are used in support of this general paradigm is far greater than that for any other discernible theoretical orientation (e.g., see Winkleby et al. (4)). An alternative theory-that the current social system, with intent and by necessity, sacrifices the well-being of most of its members in order to exploit their labor-exists as well, but is dismissed as "unscientific" (5, 6). However, stupidity, genetic inferiority, and victimization explain nothing; they merely justify everything. How, then, can social epidemiology abide by scientific rules of evidence while surrendering its observations to a framework that has no potential for explanation? We argue that the dominant methodological approach serves the dominant theory; the epidemiologic method applied to social factors as "exposures" can yield any result, and therefore provides merely an objectivist ritual rather than a valid inferential tool.
Can all this be dismissed as a mere rhetorical device? Surely Muntaner's point is that we need a different, better theory, one grounded in the requirement of social equality yet faithful to the sequences that underlie causal processes. Perhaps; but criticism based solely on a vision of what should be risks hollow optimism. Too much of the recent critical discussion in epidemiology has resorted to a hortatory and moralistic tone-"epidemiologists should be more aware of complex social interactions... more emphasis should be placed on intermediate mechanisms..."-a wish list rather than a substantive critique. If we do not understand the limitations of our current approach, it will be hard to do better.
We emphasize that we do not attempt to reject the counterfactual definition of causal effect; we are concerned here about its application. If a population is uniformly exposed and has some population parameter of interest \i, we are naturally interested in knowing the value fj,* that this parameter would take if, contrary to fact, the population had been uniformly unexposed while all other relevant preexposure factors were held constant. Where (j. * (j.*, we would say that exposure has a causal effect (although the converse is not necessarily true) (7) . The logical problem with this definition is that it restricts exposures to treatments (i.e., factors that are subject to manipulation). The practical problem is that in some settings we may not have a good method for estimating the true value of the unobserved quantity. The epidemiologic method, as reviewed in our essay (1), is one technique for arriving at an estimate of imaginary quantities such as (X*. In some settings this technique may be entirely adequate. In other settings it may yield estimates that are hopelessly wrong. Because of the particular types of exposures that occupy social epidemiologists, it is a more serious problem for us than for researchers in many other branches of the discipline. However, there are certainly other subfields that could benefit from some humility and caution regarding these issues (nutritional epidemiology, for example).
Is race a fluid category over time and space? Obviously it is. We suggest that the argument has little direct connection with the issues discussed in our essay, however. For the real people in a specific data set, the definitions of race used in other centuries or on other continents are irrelevant. For native-born African Americans surveyed in Baltimore, Maryland, or Jackson, Mississippi, for example, does it matter how they would be labeled in Brazil? The social environment is a function of the consensus racial designation in a given society. When racial definitions are made primarily on the basis of phenotype (i.e., individual attributes) in a particular time and place, no counterfactual exposure state exists for an individual, since it would require either a different set of attributes or a different time and place (8) . It is precisely the contingent nature of all social categories that undermines the use of routine statistical adjustment for such quantities. A broader perspective on the historical and ideologic basis for our social categories is certainly valuable, but it does not address the logical flaw in the epidemiologic method when applied to race as an exposure.
Social epidemiology by its nature must generate social criticism. We and Muntaner both argue that the critique being generated by social epidemiology today is ineffectual, in large measure. We are concerned that the epidemiologic method has been used as a form of sleight-of-hand to make ugly facts consistent with backward theory. Muntaner chooses to argue that the method is conditional and secondary-that what is needed is a better understanding of social mechanisms. Could we both be right?
